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ABSTRACT 
Because the proposed WIPO Broadcasting Treaty extends 
perpetual copyright-like protections to unoriginal information, its 
implementation would violate at least two fundamental limitations 
on Congress’s Copyright Clause power:  the originality and 
“limited times” requirements.  But Congress has a trump card—the 
Commerce Clause.  This iBrief argues that to give proper effect to 
the limitations of the Copyright Clause, Congress should not be 
allowed to implement copyright-like legislation under the less 
restrictive Commerce Clause. 
INTRODUCTION 
¶1 “To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that 
limitation committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed 
by those intended to be restrained?”2 
¶2 Since its first meeting in November 1998, the World Intellectual 
Property Organization’s Standing Committee on Copyright Related Rights 
(“SCCR”) has been considering a new form of copyright-like protection for 
broadcasting organizations.3  The SCCR has developed a bundle of 
“broadcasting rights” now consolidated in a second draft Treaty on the 
Protection of Broadcasting Organizations (“Broadcasting Treaty”).4  Among 
                                                     
1 J.D./LL.M. candidate, 2007, Duke University School of Law; B.A. in Political 
Science and Broadcast Journalism, 2004, The Pennsylvania State University 
Schreyer Honors College.  
2 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176 (1803).  
3 World Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO], Standing Committee on 
Copyright and Related Rights, Consolidated Text for a Treaty on the Protection 
of Broadcasting Organizations, Introductory Notes 1, SCCR/11/3, (Feb. 29, 
2004), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/meetings/2004/sccr/pdf/sccr_11_3.pdf 
[hereinafter SCCR/11/3].  
4 WIPO, Standing Committee on Copyright Related Rights, Second Revised 
Consolidated Text for a Treaty on the Protection of Broadcasting Organizations, 
SCCR/12/2 (Rev. 2), (May 2, 2005), available at 
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the exclusive rights secured to broadcasting organizations by the proposed 
Treaty are the rights to authorize retransmission of a broadcast,5 
transmission of a broadcast to the public,6 fixation of a broadcast,7 
reproduction of a broadcast,8 and distribution and dissemination of a 
broadcast.9  Broadcasting organizations will enjoy these exclusive rights for 
a period of “at least” fifty years following their broadcasts.10   
¶3 As currently written, the Broadcasting Treaty would likely be 
unconstitutional as exceeding Congress’s Article I, Section 8 powers if 
implemented into U.S. law. First, the Broadcasting Treaty would grant 
copyright-like protections to unoriginal broadcast “signals” in violation of 
the originality requirement of the Copyright Clause.11  Second, by 
extending what can be construed as perpetual copyright-like “broadcasting 
rights,” the Treaty violates the “limited times” requirement of the Copyright 
Clause.12  While the Treaty could theoretically be implemented under the 
less restrictive Commerce Clause, this iBrief argues that Congress should 
not be able to circumvent express limitations of the Copyright Clause by 
invoking its commerce authority.   
¶4 The iBrief begins by examining congressional power to enact 
“copyright-like” legislation under the Copyright Clause.  It then considers 
congressional authority to enact this legislation under the Commerce 
Clause.  Finally, it concludes with a discussion of the relationship between 
the two clauses and the implications of the relationship for the 
constitutionality of the Broadcasting Treaty.    
                                                                                                                       
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/sccr/en/sccr_12/sccr_12_2_rev_2.doc 
[hereinafter SCCR/12/2 (Rev. 2)].   
5 Id. art. 6. 
6 Id. art. 7. 
7 Id. art. 8. 
8 Id. art. 9. 
9 Id. arts. 10–12; cf. United States Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 106–106A 
(2000).   
10 SCCR/12/2 (Rev. 2), supra note 4, art. 15.   
11 SCCR/12/2 (Rev. 2), supra note 4, art. 3. 
12 Id. art. 15; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  This iBrief focuses exclusively on the 
originality and “limited times” problems with the Broadcasting Treaty.  
However, there are other potential constitutional infirmities in the Treaty.  For a 
good summary of other potential problems, see Top 10 Reasons to Reject the 
WIPO Committee Chairman’s Consolidated Text for a Broadcasting Treaty, 
http://www.ipjustice.org/WIPO/top10reasons.shtml (last visited Mar. 27, 2006) 
[hereinafter Top 10], and James Boyle, “James Boyle’s Predictions in 
Technology Law and Policy for 2006,” DUKE L. & TECH. REV. iBlawg, 
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/iblawg/?p=16 (Feb. 15, 2006). 
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I.  THE BROADCASTING TREATY AND THE COPYRIGHT CLAUSE 
¶5 The Copyright Clause of the United States Constitution is “both a 
grant of power and a limitation.”13  When forming the Clause, the Framers 
struck a delicate balance between unrestricted competition and creation 
incentivised through state-granted monopolies.14  To protect this balance, 
the Clause assures that copyrights cover only original material and last for 
finite periods of time.15    
A. The originality requirement of the Copyright Clause is a 
fundamental limitation on Congress’s power to legislate under the 
Clause.      
¶6 The Copyright Clause grants to Congress the power to “promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their respective Writings.”16  The U.S. 
Supreme Court has interpreted the words “authors” and “writings” in the 
clause to require a degree of originality before copyright protection may 
attach.17  In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., the 
Court rejected the “sweat of the brow” theory that copyright protection was 
justified by effort alone18 and held, “Originality remains the sine qua non of 
copyright; accordingly, copyright protection may extend only to those 
components of a work that are original to the author.”19   
¶7 While the Court made the originality hurdle a low one—requiring 
only independent creation by the author and some minimal level of 
creativity20—it nonetheless considered the requirement constitutionally 
mandated.21  Thus, copyright protection cannot be extended to cover works 
lacking at least a modicum of originality.22     
                                                     
13 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 (2003) (quoting Graham v. John Deere 
Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966) (emphasis added)).  
14 See Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966).   
15 James Boyle, “Constitutional Circumvention,” FT.COM,  
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/fa07af4a-fadc-11da-b4d0-0000779e2340.html (June 
13, 2006). 
16 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.   
17 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991).   
18 Id. at 359–60. 
19 Id. at 348.   
20 Id. at 345. 
21 Id. at 346.   
22 Id.  
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B. The “limited times” provision of the Copyright Clause is a 
fundamental limitation on Congress’s power to legislate under the 
Clause.      
¶8 In addition to requiring originality, the Copyright Clause mandates 
that copyrights be granted only for “limited time[s].”23  The “limited times” 
provision was the subject of a recent Supreme Court decision on the 
constitutionality of the federal Copyright Term Extension Act (“CTEA”).24  
In Eldred v. Ashcroft, the petitioners (whose businesses relied on formerly 
copyrighted works that had passed into the public domain) argued that the 
CTEA created perpetual copyright protection by retrospectively extending 
the term of existing copyrights from the life of the author plus fifty years to 
the life of the author plus seventy years.25  If Congress could extend the 
duration of existing copyrights, the petitioners argued, Congress could 
effectively create a perpetual right through successive term extensions.26  
While the Court held that the CTEA should not be construed as creating 
perpetual copyrights because of a long history of similar copyright 
extensions,27 it nonetheless recognized that the “limited times” language of 
the Copyright Clause imposed an express limitation on Congress’s ability to 
grant copyrights.28   
¶9 Since Eldred, several U.S. courts have likewise viewed the “limited 
times” portion of the Copyright Clause as a limitation on congressional 
power.29  In particular, a line of cases has developed interpreting the 
constitutionality of federal “anti-bootlegging” statutes passed by Congress 
to implement provisions of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS Agreement”).30  The statutes impose 
both civil31 and criminal32 penalties on anyone who makes unauthorized 
recordings of live musical performances, or who transmits, distributes, sells, 
rents, or traffics in such recordings.  Crucially, these protections have no 
                                                     
23 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  
24 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000); Eldred, 537 U.S. at 192–93.  
25 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 193.  
26 Id. at 208. 
27 Id. at 209–10.  
28 Id. 
29 See United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1274 n.9 (11th Cir. 1999); 
Kiss Catalog v. Passport Int’l Prods. (Kiss II), 450 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1176 (C.D. 
Cal. 2005); United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 422–23 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004); Kiss Catalog v. Passport Int’l Prods. (Kiss I), 350 F. Supp. 2d 823, 832–
33 (C.D. Cal. 2004). 
30 See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1272 (explaining history of anti-bootlegging 
laws); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (implementing TRIPS).   
31 17 U.S.C. § 1101 (2000).   
32 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (2000).   
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time limit and apparently last into perpetuity.33  Consequently, critics have 
challenged the anti-bootlegging statutes as running afoul of the Copyright 
Clause’s “limited times” requirement.34 
¶10 In 1999, the Eleventh Circuit first recognized that “the anti-
bootlegging statute may be faced with . . . constitutional problem[s] under 
the Copyright Clause,” because “the protection afforded to live performance 
. . . contains no express time limitation and would arguably persist 
indefinitely.”35  While the court did not decide the Copyright Clause issue 
because the argument was raised only in a footnote, two subsequent district 
court decisions definitively held the anti-bootlegging statutes 
unconstitutional as violating the “limited times” requirement.36   
¶11 First, in United States v. Martignon, the District Court for the 
Southern District of New York held, “It is undeniable that the anti-
bootlegging statute grants seemingly perpetual protection to live musical 
performances, and therefore would run afoul of the Copyright Clause.”37  
Shortly thereafter, in Kiss Catalog v. Passport International Productions 
(“Kiss I”), the District Court for the Central District of California held that 
the civil version of the anti-bootlegging statute “creates perpetual copyright-
like protection in violation of the ‘for limited times’ restriction of the 
Copyright Clause.”38  Taken together, these cases support the conclusion 
that laws granting perpetual copyright-like protections cannot be sustained 
under the Copyright Clause.   
C. The Broadcasting Treaty unconstitutionally creates copyright-like 
rights over unoriginal information that can last into perpetuity.  
¶12 Like the rights granted by the anti-bootlegging statutes, the rights 
granted under the current draft of the Broadcasting Treaty are copyright-
like.  Closely mirroring the substantive protections in the Copyright Act, the 
rights in the Broadcasting Treaty include the exclusive rights of fixation 
(art. 8), transmission (arts. 6, 11), distribution (arts. 7, 10, 12), and 
reproduction (art. 9) of broadcasts.39  In fact, the WIPO committee 
                                                     
33 Moghadam, 175 F. 3d at 1274 n. 9; 18 U.S.C. § 2319A.   
34 See, e.g., Moghadam, 175 F. 3d at 1274 n.9.   
35 Id.  
36 United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Kiss 
Catalog v. Passport Int’l Prods. (Kiss I), 350 F. Supp. 2d 823, 833 (C.D. Cal. 
2004). 
37 Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 424. 
38 Kiss I, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 833.  
39 SCCR/12/2 (Rev. 2), supra note 4.  Compare these rights to those reserved to 
copyright holders in the U.S. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 106–106A (2000), 
including the exclusive rights of a copyright holder to reproduce, distribute, 
perform, display and transmit their work.   
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responsible for drafting the Treaty is tellingly named the “Standing 
Committee on Copyright and Related Rights.”40  There can be little doubt 
that the Broadcasting Treaty is meant to confer upon broadcasters a right 
closely analogous to a copyright.  Thus, the natural place to find 
congressional authority to implement the Treaty is the Copyright Clause.  
However, for at least two reasons, the Broadcasting Treaty cannot be 
implemented under this clause.     
1. The broadcasting rights cover unoriginal broadcast signals. 
¶13 First, the Broadcasting Treaty would grant copyright-like protection 
to unoriginal information in violation of the express mandate of Feist.41  
While a number of courts have recognized that some broadcasts are 
sufficiently original for copyright protection because of the creativity in the 
selection and arrangement of camera shots,42 the broadcasting rights do not 
attach to the broadcast’s content.43  Instead, they attach only to broadcast 
“signals.”44  While this may be too obvious to state, it is hard to imagine 
what originality could subsist in the creation of electronic “signals.”45   
¶14 For example, consider the broadcast of “The Little Mermaid,”46 a 
work already covered by an existing U.S. copyright held by Disney.  A 
broadcaster, say ABC Family, could get Disney’s permission to broadcast 
the movie, and in broadcasting it, gain its own additional right over Ariel 
and her aquatic entourage.  ABC’s efforts here would fall short of the 
“independent creation” and “minimal creativity” tests of Feist.47  ABC did 
not create Ariel, Sebastian, Ursula, or Prince Eric—Disney did.  Moreover, 
“once published, a work is no longer original.”48  The only thing ABC can 
claim to have independently created is a “signal,” which surely does not 
possess even a minimal degree of creativity.  While creating this signal may 
have required effort, effort alone does not merit protection.49  And yet, the 
                                                     
40 SCCR/12/2 (Rev. 2), supra note 4, Introduction (emphasis added).   
41 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991); see also 
supra Section I.A.  
42 E.g., Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, 105 F.3d 841, 847 (2d Cir. 1997).   
43 SCCR/12/2 (Rev. 2), supra note 4, art. 3(0) (“The protection granted under 
this Treaty extends only to signals used for the transmissions by the 
beneficiaries of the protection of this Treaty, and not to works and other 
protected subject matter carried by such signals.” (emphasis added)).   
44 Id.    
45 See Top 10, supra note 12 (noting the Broadcasting Treaty “grants copyright 
protection over ‘signals,’ something that is neither creative nor original and 
outside the scope of copyright protection”).  
46 THE LITTLE MERMAID (Walt Disney Pictures 1989). 
47 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) 
48 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 211 (2003). 
49 Feist, 499 U.S. at 359–60.   
 6
2006 DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW No. 16 
Broadcasting Treaty would grant ABC exclusive copyright-like rights over 
its quite un-extraordinary signal.   
¶15 In the case of an already-copyrighted work like “The Little 
Mermaid,” this additional right does not seem overly troubling in practice.  
The right would require only one additional step from someone wishing to 
use ABC’s broadcast of the film.50  Instead of getting permission from 
Disney only, as would be required under the current regime, the subsequent 
user would also need permission from ABC.  Yet even if this additional 
layer of protection might seem insignificant in practice, its constitutional 
significance is another matter.  Granting a copyright-like right over plainly 
unoriginal information runs directly counter to the Copyright Clause’s 
originality requirement.  Because of this requirement, the Broadcasting 
Treaty cannot be implemented under the Copyright Clause.   
2. The broadcasting rights can last indefinitely.   
¶16 Second, like the anti-bootlegging rights, the broadcasting rights 
arguably last into perpetuity.  While Article 15 of the Broadcasting Treaty 
implies that countries will impose a term limit for protection, the provision 
is inadequate.  It reads, “The term of protection to be granted to 
broadcasting organizations under this Treaty shall last, at least, until the end 
of a period of 50 years computed from the end of the year in which the 
broadcasting took place.”51  The problem is that the provision is easily 
circumvented.  When a broadcasting organization finds its protections on a 
certain broadcast are about to expire, it can simply rebroadcast the segment 
and obtain another fifty years of protection.52  Such action by broadcasters 
will effectively lock up the content of the broadcast indefinitely.  Indeed, 
even if it were possible to distinguish between original and rebroadcasts, the 
difficulty of making the distinction will lead many to err on the side of 
caution and treat the work as broadcast-right protected.53   
¶17 It appears the drafting parties recognized this potential loophole as 
the majority of draft proposals suggested that the term of protection begin 
when the broadcast took place “for the first time.”54  The “for the first time” 
                                                     
50 Cf. Boyle, supra note 12 (noting that the broadcasting rights will add to the 
already dense “rights thicket” which requires extensive clearance procedures for 
utilizing copyrighted works).     
51 SCCR/12/2 (Rev. 2), supra note 4, art. 15. 
52 See Boyle, supra note 12 (noting that broadcasting rights “could be gained 
again and again over the same work, even one on which the copyright term had 
lapsed”).   
53 See Boyle, supra note 15 (noting that already “[m]any libraries simply refuse 
to allow screening of movies until the copyright term has expired” even though 
no one would object because “the legal risk is too great”).   
54 SCCR/11/3, supra note 3, Explanatory Comment 15.04.  
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qualification was removed from the consolidated draft Treaty, however, 
because the parties agreed the Treaty is meant to apply to broadcast 
“signals” that “by their nature occur only one time.”55  Even if this 
explanation is accepted, it is still incomplete.  If the Broadcasting Treaty 
protects only broadcast signals without regard to the content of the 
broadcast, a given piece of content (again using the example of “The Little 
Mermaid”) could be rebroadcast via a different signal and thereby tied up in 
a new fifty-year term of protection.56  After all, how can one distinguish 
between two broadcasts with identical content (Ariel, Sebastian and Eric 
look exactly the same) but different signals?  Potential valid uses of the 
“expired” original broadcasts will be chilled because of the difficulty in 
distinguishing between the original and the rebroadcast version.  Again, the 
effect of these deficiencies is to permit broadcasters to lock up content 
indefinitely.   
¶18 Because the Broadcasting Treaty creates an unlimited term of 
copyright-like protection for unoriginal information, it would likely be 
unconstitutional if implemented under the Copyright Clause.57  Thus, the 
question becomes whether Congress may nonetheless implement the Treaty 
under another of its Article I powers.   
II. THE BROADCASTING TREATY AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 
A. Standing alone, the Commerce Clause seems to provide Congress 
with the authority to implement the Broadcasting Treaty.   
¶19 After the Copyright Clause, the most likely place for finding 
congressional authority to implement the Broadcasting Treaty is under the 
Commerce Clause.58  Copyrights are, after all, limited monopolies meant to 
incentivize creation—to “promote the progress” of the useful arts by 
securing their value in commerce.59  And indeed, the Supreme Court has 
construed Congress’s commerce power broadly to include the ability to 
regulate the channels and instrumentalities of interstate commerce as well as 
intrastate activities substantially affecting interstate commerce.60   
¶20 A plainly “interstate” law, the Broadcasting Treaty is meant to 
apply “across borders.”61  It seeks to protect “authors, performers and 
producers” from having the legitimate market for their works diminished by 
                                                     
55 Id.   
56 Boyle, supra note 12.  
57 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; infra Section II.A.  
58 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
59 Id. cl. 8.  
60 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995).  
61 SCCR/12/2 (Rev. 2), supra note 4, Preamble.  
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piracy.62  This concern about market harms clearly suggests the Treaty’s 
intended impact on interstate and international commerce.  Indeed, the 
difficult question is not whether the Commerce Clause, standing alone, 
gives Congress the power to implement the Broadcasting Treaty; it does.63  
The difficult question is whether, in light of the express originality and 
“limited times” requirements of the Copyright Clause,64 Congress may 
nevertheless enact the Treaty under the less restrictive Commerce Clause.   
B. Considered in context, the Commerce Clause cannot permit 
Congress to implement perpetual copyright-like protection for 
unoriginal information.    
¶21 The question of whether Congress may use the Commerce Clause 
to implement legislation that would be unconstitutional under the Copyright 
Clause has been most debated in the context of the anti-bootlegging statutes.  
Because the anti-bootlegging rights are similar to the broadcasting rights, 
these cases are instructive in the present analysis of the Broadcasting 
Treaty.   
1.  United States v. Moghadam.65  
¶22 The first court to consider whether the Copyright Clause imposes 
affirmative limits on other constitutional powers was the Eleventh Circuit in 
United States v. Moghadam.66  The court phrased the issue in the following 
manner:  “[W]hether Congress can use its Commerce Clause power to avoid 
the limitations that might prevent it from passing the same [anti-
bootlegging] legislation under the Copyright Clause.”67  To answer the 
question, the Eleventh Circuit developed two models of constitutional 
interpretation.  The first, following the reasoning of Heart of Atlanta Motel, 
Inc. v. United States,68 is that “each of the powers of Congress is alternative 
to all of the other powers, and what cannot be done under one of them may 
very well be doable under another.”69  The second, following the reasoning 
                                                     
62 See id.; see United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1276 (11th Cir. 1999) 
(noting that activities that “depress . . . legitimate markets” by satisfying demand 
through “unauthorized channels” are inherently commercial in nature).   
63 See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1282; Kiss Catalog v. Passport Int’l Prods. (Kiss 
II), 405 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1171–73 (C.D. Cal. 2005).  
64 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
65 175 F.3d 1269. 
66 Id.  
67 Id. at 1277.  
68 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (discussing 
the relationship between congressional power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the Commerce Clause).   
69 Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1277.  
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of Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons,70 is that “some of the 
grants of legislative authority in Article I, § 8 contain significant 
limitations” that should affirmatively prohibit Congress “from passing 
certain types of legislation, no matter under which provision.”71   
¶23 Because the Moghadam Court found that the Copyright Clause’s 
“fixation requirement” (found in the word “writings”) was stated in 
“positive terms” with no express limitations—and because the statute in 
question was not “fundamentally inconsistent” with this fixation 
requirement—it held that the requirement did not prevent Congress from 
enacting copyright-like protections under the Commerce Clause.72  The 
decision left open the question, however, of whether the Copyright Clause’s 
more “fundamental”73 originality and “limited times” requirements—
arguably stated in less “positive terms” with a clearer “negative pregnant”—
could likewise be circumvented. 
2. United States v. Martignon.74
¶24 United States v. Martignon answered this narrower question in the 
negative.75  Like Moghadam, Martignon involved the constitutionality of an 
anti-bootlegging statute,76 but unlike Moghadam, Martignon explicitly 
considered the effect of the Copyright Clause’s “limited times” requirement 
on other constitutional powers.77  This difference proved crucial to the 
court’s holding.  Adopting Moghadam’s suggestion that legislation 
“fundamentally inconsistent” with a requirement of the Copyright Clause 
may not be constitutionally passed under the Commerce Clause,78 the 
Martignon court held,  “The anti-bootlegging statute’s failure to impose a 
durational limitation on its regulation is ‘fundamentally inconsistent’ with 
the Copyright Clause’s requirement that copyright-like regulations only 
persist for ‘Limited Times.’”79  In so holding, the court rejected the Heart of 
                                                     
70 Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 468–69 (1982) 
(discussing conflict between the “uniformity requirement” of the Bankruptcy 
Clause and the Commerce Clause).   
71 Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1279.  
72 Id. at 1280.  
73 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 355 (1991).  
(characterizing the originality requirement as “fundamental”); United States v. 
Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); see also supra Section 
II.A–B.  
74 346 F. Supp. 2d at 413.  
75 Id. at 419.   
76 In this case, it was the criminal version of the statute (18 U.S.C. § 2319A 
(2000)) at issue.  
77 Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 424. 
78 United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1280 (11th Cir. 1999).  
79 Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 429.  
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Atlanta model—that each of Congress’s powers is an alternative to all the 
others.80  Instead, the court distinguished Heart of Atlanta from cases 
involving the Copyright Clause because the Fourteenth Amendment (the 
authority under which Congress erroneously believed it was acting when 
passing the Civil Rights Act at issue in the case), unlike the Copyright 
Clause, “is solely an affirmative grant of power—without any express 
limitations.”81 
3. Kiss Catalog v. Passport International Productions (“Kiss I”).82
¶25 The Martignon decision was followed three months later in Kiss I, 
another decision on the constitutionality of the anti-bootlegging 
legislation.83  Following similar reasoning as Martignon, Kiss I held the 
civil anti-bootlegging statute unconstitutional as violating the “limited 
times” requirements of the Copyright Clause.84  And, on the more critical 
question of whether Congress could still pass the statute under the 
Commerce Clause, the court adopted the Railway Labor logic:  “[A]llowing 
Congress to invoke the Commerce Clause in a situation where the 
Copyright Clause would otherwise be violated would ‘eradicate from the 
Constitution a limitation on the power of Congress.’”85   
4. Kiss Catalog v. Passport International Productions (“Kiss II”).86
¶26 The Kiss I holding was short-lived, however.  Upon a motion to 
intervene by the United States, Judge Rea, who wrote the opinion in Kiss I, 
agreed to reconsider the anti-bootlegging statute’s constitutionality.87  Then, 
exactly one year after Judge Rea held the anti-bootlegging statute 
unconstitutional in Kiss I, Judge Fischer reached the opposite conclusion in 
Kiss II.88 
¶27 The holding of Kiss II is twofold.  First, the court held that the anti-
bootlegging statue “does not fall within the purview of the Copyright 
Clause” and is therefore not subject to that Clause’s limitations.89  The court 
found the anti-bootlegging statue to be outside the ambit of the Copyright 
Clause because the law covers subject matter (i.e. live musical 
                                                     
80 Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1279–80.  
81 Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 428 n.19. 
82 350 F. Supp. 2d 823 (C.D. Cal. 2004). 
83 Id.  The case concerned the civil version of the anti-bootlegging statute (17 
U.S.C. § 1101 (2000)).  
84 Kiss I, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 836–37. 
85 Id. at 837 (quoting Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 
457, 469 (1982)).   
86 405 F. Supp. 2d 1169 (C.D. Cal. 2005).  
87 Id. at 1170. 
88 Id. at 1176.  
89 Id. at 1175.  
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performances) “not otherwise addressed, prohibited, or protected by the 
Copyright Clause.”90  In the alternative, the court held that even if a 
“fundamental conflict” with the Copyright Clause would negate legislation 
otherwise sustainable under the Commerce Clause, no such conflict existed 
in this case.91  Because, as noted, the court believed the anti-bootlegging 
statue covers subject matter “not previously protected—or protectible—
under the Copyright Clause,” the statute “complements” rather than 
conflicts with the Copyright Clause.92 
¶28 In sum, while the majority of these cases suggest that Congress may 
not use its commerce power to transcend a fundamental limitation of the 
Copyright Clause, the question is far from resolved.  In the case of the 
Broadcasting Treaty, the conflict between the Copyright and Commerce 
Clauses is even more pronounced.  
C. Because the Broadcasting Treaty creates perpetual copyright-like 
rights over unoriginal information, it cannot be constitutionally 
implemented by Congress even under the Commerce Clause.  
¶29 Since Kiss II is the only dissenting voice in the anti-bootlegging 
cases, its arguments supporting Congress’s ability to implement the 
Broadcasting Treaty under the Commerce Clause93 are worth addressing 
first.  Kiss II’s holding—essentially that anti-bootlegging rights are not the 
stuff of copyright—cannot realistically be read to cover the broadcasting 
rights.  The broadcasting rights are distinguishable from the anti-
bootlegging rights for several reasons.   
¶30 In many ways, the broadcasting rights are even closer to falling 
within the ambit of copyright than anti-bootlegging rights.  First, while 
copyrights have never been available for unrecorded live musical 
performances,94 they are available for simultaneously recorded live 
                                                     
90 Id. at 1176 (“[O]nce the Court concludes that the Statute does not fall within 
the purview of the Copyright Clause, it need no longer consider whether it 
complies with the limitations of the Copyright Clause.  To do so imports into the 
Commerce Clause limits that clause does not have.  That the Statute might 
provide ‘copyright-like’ or ‘copyright-related’ protection to matters clearly not 
covered by the Copyright Clause is not important.  One need only find an 
alternative source of constitutional authority.”).   
91 Id.  
92 Id.  
93 Id.  
94 Id. (noting that the anti-bootlegging statute “proscribes conduct not otherwise 
addressed . . . by the Copyright Clause:  the non-consensual recording of a live 
performance”).   
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broadcasts.95  Indeed, Congress recently adopted a statute specifically 
intended to permit copyright protection for such broadcasts.96  Thus, while 
anti-bootlegging rights may not be “otherwise addressed, prohibited, or 
protected by the Copyright Clause,”97 broadcasting rights clearly are.  A 
broadcaster can obtain a copyright over his creation (the content, not the 
signal) by simply recording (i.e. “fixing”) the broadcast (as, for example, 
the National Basketball Association does when it broadcasts its games).98   
¶31 Second, the substantive protections afforded to broadcasters by the 
Treaty99 are nearly identical to the protections granted to copyright holders 
by the Copyright Act.100  Both secure the exclusive rights of reproduction, 
distribution, and transmission of the work.101  Like traditional property 
rights, these rights all make information excludable, the very essence of 
“intellectual property.”102   
¶32 Third, the same policy underlies both copyrights and broadcasting 
rights.  Both rights seek to increase the amount and quality of works of 
authorship by incentivizing investment in content production.103  Similar to 
copyright protection, the Broadcasting Treaty grants to the broadcaster an 
exclusive right to his creation and protection against copying and piracy to 
encourage production and dissemination.104   
¶33 There is also an important difference between the anti-bootlegging 
and broadcasting rights.  Unlike the anti-bootlegging rights, which were 
created by Congress in the first instance, the broadcasting rights were 
created by an international body (WIPO).  Thus, while there may be a 
“presumption of constitutionality”105 when Congress actually creates the 
                                                     
95 See Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, 105 F.3d 841, 847 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(noting that “recorded broadcasts of NBA games . . . are now entitled to 
copyright protection”); Boyle, supra note 12 (noting that broadcasting rights 
cover “works that are at the heart of copyright, indeed which might themselves 
be copyrighted by their authors”).  
96 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).   
97 Kiss II, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 1176.  
98 See generally Motorola, 105 F.3d 841.   
99 See SCCR/12/2 (Rev. 2), supra note 4, arts. 6–13.  
100 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106–106A.   
101 Id.; SCCR/12/2 (Rev. 2), supra note 4.   
102 See United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
103 Compare Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and 
Useful Arts: The Background and Origin of the Intellectual Property Clause of 
the United States Constitution, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (1994) with SCCR/1/9, 
Report (Nov. 10, 1998), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/meetings/1998/sccr_98/pdf/1_9.pdf.  
104 See SCCR/1/9, Report at ¶ 175.   
105 Kiss Catalog v. Passport Int’l Prods. (Kiss II), 405 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1172 
(C.D. Cal. 2005). 
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rights at issue, the presumption seems inapposite where Congress is merely 
implementing rights created by an international body less familiar with the 
nuances of U.S. copyright law.   
¶34 In considering the similarities between copyrights and broadcasting 
rights, it seems disingenuous to argue that the broadcasting rights are not 
the stuff of copyright—that they somehow fall outside the purview of the 
Copyright Clause.  To the contrary, the broadcasting rights are copyrights, 
both in their terms and in their intended effect.  As such, these rights should 
be implemented only under the Copyright Clause.  Indeed, as one scholar 
has concluded, “Commerce Clause legislation that vests property rights in 
information decreases the amount and type of information freely available 
as surely as when Congress legislates under the Copyright Clause.”106    
¶35 More generally, the logic of Kiss II represents one of two opposite 
constructions of the Constitution.  The Kiss II Court conceived of the 
Constitution as “a series of hermetically sealed provisions.”107  Once the 
court found congressional authority under the broad Commerce Clause, its 
analysis was essentially over.108  To the extent that the other enumerated 
powers do not affirmatively limit congressional power, this construction is 
not especially problematic.109  But, where the other enumerated powers 
contain limitations (like the “limited times” limitation of the Copyright 
Clause or the uniformity limitation of the Bankruptcy Clause) the danger of 
eradicating these limitations from the Constitution is great.110  This danger 
is exacerbated by the Supreme Court’s broad reading of the commerce 
power.111  If permitted to do so, the clause, covering nearly all activities 
even tangentially related to commerce, would subsume express limitations 
on more specific commercial acts.112   
                                                     
106 William Patry, The Enumerated Powers Doctrine and Intellectual Property: 
An Imminent Constitutional Collision, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 359, 371 (1999).  
107 Kiss II, 405 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1172.  
108 See id. at 1172–73.  While the court did go on to consider the statute under 
the Copyright Clause, it noted that this step was “not necessarily mandated.”  Id. 
at 1173. 
109 Picture a Venn diagram where the Copyright Clause circle is entirely 
encompassed by the broader Commerce Clause circle.  Any action taken within 
the Copyright Clause circle is also permissible under the larger Commerce 
Clause circle.   
110 Now picture a Venn diagram where part of the Copyright Clause circle (the 
originality and “limited times” portions) falls outside of the Commerce Clause 
circle.  Action taken in this outlying part of the Copyright Clause circle would 
not be permissible under the Commerce Clause circle.  
111 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995). 
112 See id. at 589 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Much if not all of Art. I, § 8 
(including portions of the Commerce Clause itself) would be surplusage if 
Congress had been given authority over matters that substantially affect 
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¶36 A more appropriate conception of the Constitution is to see it as an 
integrated document; a limitation in one part of the document may well 
proscribe action pursuant to another part of the document.  This view is well 
summarized by Harvard Law Professor Laurence Tribe:  “Read in isolation, 
most of the Constitution’s provisions make only a highly limited kind of 
sense.  Only as an interconnected whole do these provisions meaningfully 
constitute a frame of government.”113  In other words, the Constitution is a 
package deal.   
¶37 Viewed as a whole, each of the congressional powers in Article I, 
Section 8 should not be seen as occupying the same plane of specification.  
The Commerce Clause is a general grant of authority while the Copyright 
Clause is a more specific application of that general authority.114  
Copyrights affect commerce, but they affect commerce in specific ways 
with specific consequences and are therefore handled in more detail in the 
Copyright Clause.  To gloss over this detail and summarily conclude that 
copyright-like legislation is at its heart commercial legislation (and 
therefore permissible under the Commerce Clause) is to render a good 
portion of Article I, Section 8 surplusage.115  The Supreme Court rejected 
this result as early as Marbury v. Madison when Chief Justice Marshall 
famously announced, “It cannot be presumed that any clause in the 
constitution is intended to be without effect; and therefore such a 
construction is inadmissible, unless the words require it.”116  In short, 
instead of viewing the Copyright Clause and the Commerce Clause as 
parallel and co-equal grants of power,117 it is more in keeping with the goals 
of each provision to view the Copyright Clause as a subset of the general 
Commerce Clause power.   
                                                                                                                       
interstate commerce.  An interpretation of cl. 3 that makes the rest of § 8 
superfluous simply cannot be correct.  Yet this Court’s Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence has endorsed just such an interpretation: the power we have 
accorded Congress has swallowed Art. I, § 8.”).   
113 Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-
Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1235 
(1995).  
114 See William W. Van Alstyne, Reconciling What the First Amendment 
Forbids with What the Copyright Clause Permits, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
225, 226 (2003) (describing the Copyright Clause as a “very specific, 
enumerated power” and a “specifically targeted clause”).  
115 See Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 469 (1982); 
Kiss Catalog v. Passport Int’l Prods. (Kiss I), 350 F. Supp. 2d 823, 837 (C.D. 
Cal. 2004). 
116 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 167 (1803). 
117 E.g., Kiss Catalog v. Passport Int’l Prods. (Kiss II), 405 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 
1175 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (discussing the “separate, co-equal character of 
constitutional grants” (quoting 1 RAYMOND T. NIMMER, INFORMATION LAW 
§ 6:30 (2005))).  
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¶38 If properly constructed to recognize both grants and limitations of 
power,118 the Constitution leaves little room for the implementation of the 
Broadcasting Treaty.  An honest evaluation of the broadcasting rights 
reveals that they are nearly indistinguishable from copyrights in almost 
every respect.  The broadcasting rights do differ, however, in two crucial 
respects—they protect unoriginal information and are perpetual.  These 
differences place the Broadcasting Treaty beyond Congress’s copyright 
authority and ought to place it beyond Congress’s commerce authority as 
well.   
CONCLUSION 
¶39 Both on its face, and in effect, the Broadcasting Treaty creates 
rights over information closely analogous to copyrights.  By allowing 
broadcasters to acquire rights over unoriginal broadcast signals, and to 
acquire a new term of protection over the same content by simply re-
broadcasting, the Treaty violates the originality and “limited times” 
requirements of the Copyright Clause.119  Because the Treaty would violate 
fundamental limitations of the Copyright Clause (the clause under which the 
Treaty would be most properly enacted) Congress should be forbidden from 
enacting the Treaty under the less restrictive Commerce Clause.  While the 
Copyright Clause may appear to be solely a grant of power, it must be read 
to have limitations.120 
¶40 As Justice Marshall stated, “Affirmative words are often, in their 
operation, negative of other objects than those affirmed; and in this case, a 
negative or exclusive sense must be given to them or they have not 
operation at all.”121  To construe the Copyright Clause as a self-contained 
affirmative grant of power is to give certain words in the Clause no 
operation at all.   
                                                     
118 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 (2003) (quoting Graham v. John Deere 
Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966)).  
119 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.  
120 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 212; United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1280 
(11th Cir. 1999).  
121 Marbury, 5 U.S. at 167.   
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